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NOTES
Bystander Recovery in Illinois
for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority
INTRODUCTION
The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress began to
evolve when courts first recognized claims for relief by direct
victims of tortfeasors' wrongful acts.' Initially, courts hesitated
to acknowledge the victim's right to recover under this cause of
action because of the difficulty inherent in proving emotional
injuries, the fear of a flood of fraudulent litigation, and the prob-
lems in defining foreseeability and limiting liability.2 These pol-
icy interests no longer bar recovery by the direct victim of a tort-
feasor's negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The theories of recovery created nearly a century ago to accom-
modate such policy interests nonetheless remain firmly entrenched
in present day tort law as applied to a bystander's right to recover
under this cause of action.3 In those jurisdictions adhering to the
impact rule, for example, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's negligence produced both a physical contact and an
emotional disturbance in order to recover. 4 In other jurisdictions,
the zone of physical danger test permits recovery only if the
plaintiff has suffered emotional distress because he was also in
1. The term "emotional distress" has been used to describe such diverse phenomena
as fright and its physical consequences, anxiety, humiliation, grief, and rage. Brody,
Negligently Inflicting Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VILL. L. REV. 232, 232
(1961). Traditionally, the psychic and physical components of emotional distress claims
were differentiated. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOIRS § 46 comment j (1965). For
purposes of this note, the term "emotional distress" will encompass both the psychic and
physical reactions engendered by the defendant's negligent conduct. See infra notes 158-
60 and accompanying text.
2. As one commentator stated, duty is no more then the sum total of those policy
considerations which lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to legal
protection. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRs 325-26 (4th ed. 1971).
3. Just as in the case of direct victim causes of action, however, most of these policy
arguments no longer justify the denial of relief to bystanders. See infra notes 167-84 and
accompanying text.
4. The impact rule originated in England in the case of Victoria Ry. Comm'r v. Coul-
tas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888). In this case, the court held that where a passenger train
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imminent peril of physical injury.5 A majority of jurisdictions
follow one of these traditional theories of recovery in evaluating
claims by bystanders for negligently inflicted emotional distress.6
Because of the impact rule's requirement of physical contact
and the necessity of imminent peril of physical injury under the
zone of physical danger rule, most jurisdictions have refused to
allow bystanders to recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.7 Recently, however, courts have begun to question the
appropriateness of these rules with respect to plaintiffs other
than direct victims who claim that their emotional distress
resulted from witnessing the infliction of tortious injuries upon
another.8
A minority of jurisdictions have responded to the bystander's
plight by recognizing a new basis for bystander recovery. 9 This
theory is founded on a standard of foreseeability, under which
the plaintiff must prove that he was near enough in time and dis-
nearly hit the plaintiff due to the negligence of a train employee, recovery would not be
allowed for emotional injury without any actual physical injury. Id. at 225.
5. The concept on which zone of physical danger rule is based also originated in Eng-
land in Dulieu v. White, 2 K.B. 669 (1901), in which the court abandoned the impact rule
in England. The court reasoned that a cause and effect relation did not necessarily exist
between impact and fright, stating that the focus should be on the emotional harm rather
than the physical impact. The court thus held that fright which arises from a reasonable
fear of immediate personal injury to oneself should also be compensated. Id. at 675.
6. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965); Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d
1337 (1970).
7. See Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A
Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. I. REv. 477, 488-90 (1982).
8. In most cases, bystander plaintiffs usually have close familial relationships with
the primary victims of the defendants' negligence. See infra note 84 and accompanying
text. For purposes of this note, the term "bystander" will not be used in the generic sense
of the average eyewitness to a tortious occurrence, but to indicate a close family member
who witnesses the tortious injury of the primary victim. The term "primary victim" will
designate the initial subject of the defendant's negligence who has suffered death or
serious bodily injury as a consequence of that wrongdoing.
9. In England, courts have long allowed recovery to bystanders who suffer emotional
distress as a result of witnessing the tortious injury of a family member. The first Eng-
lish case to permit recovery under these circumstances was Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., 1
K.B. 141 (1925). In Hambrook, the defendant's servant negligently left a truck unattended
at the top of a hill. The plaintiff mother had accompanied her children part of the dis-
tance on their way to school. Shortly thereafter, she saw the defendant's truck coming
rapidly down the street, causing her to fear for the safety of her children. Upon discover-
ing that one of her children had been injured, she sustained severe nervous shock and
later died. The court held that there should be no distinction between shock sustained by
a mother as a result of fear for her own safety, and that sustained by reason of peril to
her child. Id. at 151.
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tance to observe the tortious injury and that he had a close
familial relationship with the primary victim.10 The foreseeabil-
ity standard contemplates that a plaintiff who suffers emotional
distress under these circumstances should recover for being placed
in fear for the safety of another."
The Illinois Supreme Court recently reexamined a bystander's
right to recover based on a cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress in Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority.12 In
Rickey, the court abandoned the impact rule, which it had fol-
lowed since 1898.13 The court declined to adopt the foreseeability
standard, instead it adopted the zone of physical danger rule. In
its conservative expansion of the law, the Rickey decision has
placed bystanders in virtually no better position to recover than
under the impact rule.' 4
This note will briefly trace the historical development of tort
law with respect to the injury of emotional distress. It will then
examine the three theories of recovery for a negligent infliction
of emotional distress cause of action. An analysis of the ration-
ale and impact of the Rickey decision will follow. Finally, this
note will propose that Illinois could have achieved a better bal-
ance between the bystander's interest in recovery and the negli-
gent tortfeasor's interest in avoiding unduly burdensome liabil-
ity by adopting the foreseeability standard.
10. These guidelines were originally set forth in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441
P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
11. See Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical
Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 196 (1976); Simons, Psychic Injury and the By-
stander: The Trans-Continental Dispute Between New York and California, 51 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 1, 11 (1976).
12. 98 11. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
13. The Illinois Supreme Court originally adopted the impact rule in its decision in
Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898). See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying
text.
14. The Rickey decision has had a more positive effect on plaintiffs who are direct
victims of a defendant's negligence. Recently, a federal district court reevaluated its pre-
vious denial of damages for emotional distress experienced by passengers just prior to the
impact of an airline crash in In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 507 F. Supp. 21
(N.D. Ill. 1980). In that case, the district court examined the line of Illinois cases begin-
ning with Braun in which the impact rule had been followed, and concluded that Illinois
courts would not allow damages for a plaintiff's fear or apprehension of danger. In light
of Rickey, however, the court determined that if a plaintiff could prove physical manifes-
tations of the emotional distress which occurred prior to the impact of the crash, he would
be entitled to recover damages for pre-impact pain and suffering. It thus gave the plain-
tiffs leave to amend their complaints.
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The Cause of Action
Tort law has long distinguished between mental and physical
injury.15 Historically, the right to be free from physical intrusion
has always received legal protection. 16 For many years, how-
ever, courts expressed reluctance to similarly recognize an inter-
est in emotional tranquility as an independent, legally protected
right.1 7 Because they viewed mental disturbances such as fright
as so evanescent and intangible as to be immeasurable by any
standard then existing in the law,'8 courts refused to award
damages for the suffering of emotional injuries unless such
injuries could be brought within the scope of an already recog-
nized tort.19 The trier of fact could then consider the emotional
injury as an additional factor when awarding damages for the
host cause of action.20
Eventually, a cause of action was recognized for emotional
injury caused by the intentional misconduct of another. 2' To
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 46 comment j, 436A comment c (1965).
16. For example, the courts initially developed the tort of battery to vindicate the
plaintiffs interest in freedom from intentional and unpermitted contact with the plain-
tiff's person. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 34-37.
17. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L.
REv. 1033, 1035 (1935). The closest courts came to recognizing an interest in emotional
tranquility at that time was their recognition of the tort of assault. The tort of assault
compensates the victim for emotional injury which is intentionally inflicted. Liability
only arises, however, where the defendant places the plaintiff in imminent apprehension
of bodily harm. The interest which the tort protects is the right to be free from the appre-
hension of a harmful contact with the plaintiff's person, rather than the right to be free
from emotional harm. In this respect, the tort is analogous to the zone of physical danger
theory applied in negligent infliction of emotional distress actions. See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 37-41.
18. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 50.
19. The justification for awarding "parasitic damages" was that the courts could only
calculate damages for emotional injury when suffered in relation to the torts of assault,
battery, or false imprisonment. J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW 363-64 (1982). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 47(b) comment b (1965).
20. The effect of awarding parasitic damages for emotional injuries was to afford only
indirect protection to the interest in emotional tranquility. See Comment, Negligently
Inflicted Emotional Distress - The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEo. LJ. 1237, 1238
(1971). As one commentator has noted, however, this indirect recognition of the interest
in emotional tranquility was nonetheless important to the development of tort law.
"Treatment of any element of damages as a parasitic factor belongs essentially to a
transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is today recognized as parasitic will,
forsooth, .tomorrow, be recognized as an independent basis of liability." 1 I. STREET,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILTY 470 (1906).
21. Illinois first recognized the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of
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recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress under
both traditional and modern theories of recovery, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant acted in an extreme and outra-
geous manner, as well as the existence of a resulting severe emo-
tional injury.22 Once he has successfully proven the former, how-
ever, he has virtually assured his right to recover,23 because the
severity of the defendant's conduct vouches for the existence of
the emotional injury. 24 As with other claims based on inten-
tional wrongdoing, more emphasis is placed upon the conduct of
the defendant than upon the harm to the plaintiff under this
cause of action.25
Much more stringent prerequisites to recovery, however, have
evolved in the development of the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress cause of action. 26 Under this new cause of action,
courts could no longer rely upon the outrageousness of the
defendant's conduct to verify the plaintiff's emotional injuries.
action in Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961). In Knierim, the defendant
threatened the plaintiff with the murder of her husband, and did subsequently carry out
that threat. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected such policy considerations as the diffi-
culty in proving emotional injuries and the fear of a flood of fraudulent litigation. Id. at
84-85, 174 N.E.2d at 163-64. It noted that severe emotional injuries could be objectively
verified by the medical profession. Id. at 85, 174 N.E.2d at 164. To further aid with prob-
lems of proof, the jury could call upon its own experiences in determining whether out-
rageous conduct produced the emotional disturbance. Id. The court concluded that the
interest in peace of mind was sufficiently important to receive protection from the law
against intentional invasion. It therefore sustained the plaintiffs cause of action.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
23. Pearson, supra note 7, at 486. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
comment j (1965).
24.
(I)n such intentional misconduct there is an element of outrage, which in itself,
is an important guarantee that the mental disturbance which follows is serious
... Not only is there a normal social desire to compensate the victim at the
expense of the more heinous offender, but the danger of imposition is lessened
to a point where is becomes reasonably safe to grant the remedy.
Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874, 878
(1939). But see Comment, Emotional Distress, 15 IND. L.J. 617, 622-23 (1982).
25. The early law of intentional wrongs was primarily concerned with preserving the
peace of the realm by providing a socially acceptable, non-violent alternative to the field
of honor. While the modern law of intentional wrongs may be less concerned with deter-
ring self-help than the early law, it still falls far short of recognizing protection against
emotional harm as an end unto itself. Pearson, supra note 7, at 486.
26. See Comment, supra note 24, at 625. A survey of tort law regarding the negligent
infliction of emotional distress cause of action shows a trend of hesitant abandonment of
artificial restrictions and barriers to recovery. E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 746, 441
P.2d 912, 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 84 (1968); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 403, 520 P.2d
758, 762 (1974).
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Moreover, in contrast to the intentional torts, the general laws of
negligence emphasize proof of a legally compensable harm.27
By the time the negligent infliction of emotional distress cause
of action came to be recognized, the law had long since acknowl-
edged the fear for one's own bodily safety as a legally compen-
sable harm.28 Courts believed that this fear would engender
genuine emotional distress.29 Unable to assess emotional injuries
by any other standards then existing in the law, however, courts
initially predicated liability for this cause of action on actual or
anticipated physical intrusion to the plaintiff's person.
The Traditional Theories of Recovery
The Impact Rule
Under the impact rule, a plaintiff cannot recover absent con-
temporaneous physical contact.30 The rule requires the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant's negligence produced both an
unpermitted physical impact, which resulted in physical injury,
and an emotional disturbance. 31 The physical intrusion defines
the defendant's breach of duty. Since the plaintiff is expected to
suffer fear for his own bodily safety, his emotional distress con-
stitutes a foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct.32
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the impact rule in 1898 in
Braun v. Craven.33 In Braun, the plaintiff alleged that her land-
27. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 143-44; Pearson, supra note 7, at 486.
28. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
29. Comment, Duty, Foreseeability and the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress, 33 ME. L REv. 303, 313 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Duty, Foreseeabiltiy];
Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Liability to the Bystander, 30
MERCER L REV.. 735, 737 (1979).
30. The two most influential American cases applying the impact rule came from the
first two jurisdictions to adopt that rule. In Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45
N.E. 354 (1896), a horse drawn carriage stopped so close to a pregnant woman that she
stood between the heads of the horses. She fainted and later miscarried. The New York
court denied recovery for the mental anguish and the miscarriage on the ground that
there was no impact and that since there could be no recovery for mere fright, none could
be had for injuries which were the direct consequences of it. Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354.
Recovery was also denied in Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88
(1897). In this case, the conductor of a street car attempted to eject a noisy rider by fright-
ening him. Because the conductor's actions had not produced a physical impact, the court
refused to allow recovery for fright and mental suffering. Id. at 286, 47 N.E. at 89.
31. See, e.g., Comment, Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reap-
praisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 512, 521 (1968).
32. Pearson, supra note 7, at 488-90.
33. 175 IM. 401,51 N.E. 657 (1898).
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lord had stealthily entered her room, taken her by surprise, and,
in a violent manner, abused her verbally. The court stated that
the defendant could not reasonably have anticipated that his
language or gestures would cause the plaintiff severe nervous
shock.34 It thus held that terror or fright, unaccompanied by a
contemporaneous physical impact, does not create liability in the
defendant. 35
Most early courts' refusals to award damages for emotional
injuries alone without accompanying physical contact were based
on one of several factors. Courts believed that emotional injuries
were vague and intangible concepts, which might prevent a jury
from accurately calculating damages.36 Further, many feared
that plaintiffs could easily feign emotional injury, potentially
resulting in a flood of fraudulent claims.37 Finally, emotional
injuries were deemed remote and unexpected results of most
defendants' negligence. A reasonably prudent person thus could
not foresee that a given plaintiff would suffer emotional harm.38
Because the plaintiff must directly incur a physical impact to
recover, the rule does not accommodate one who suffers emo-
tional distress as a result of witnessing the tortious injury of
another but who experiences no accompanying physical impact.3 9
The impact rule has thus proven a virtually insurmountable bar-
rier to bystander recovery. 40 The harshness of the impact rule
34. Id. at 406, 51 N.E. at 659.
35. Id. at 420, 51 N.E. at 664.
36. See, e.g., Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Ward v. West
Jersey & Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900); Mitchell v. Rochester, 151 N.Y.
107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
37. See, e.g., Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 567 (1898); Morse v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry., 117 Ky. 11, 77 S.W. 361 (1903); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47
N.E. 88 (1897).
38. See Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383,47 A. 561 (1900); Ewing v.
Pittsburgh C., C., & St. Louis R.R., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892).
39. Two early cases, however, did permit recovery for emotional distress absent phys-
ical impact. Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 672, 58 So. 927, cert. denied, 177 Ala. 672,
58 So. 1038 (1912), involved the mother of two children who were passengers in a run-
away buggy. The mother suffered fear for the safety of her children and later suffered
physical illness as well. The second case was Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 A.D. 791,
148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914). In this case, the plaintiff was so overcome by fright that she fainted
and fell into an elevator shaft upon seeing two of her children ascend in an unattended
elevator. Neither of these cases, however, has played a significant role in the develop-
ment of the law.
40. Illinois, for example, has continually denied relief to bystander plaintiffs under
the impact rule. See, e.g., Carlinville Nat'l Bank v. Rhoads, 63 M1. App. 3d 502,380 N.E.2d
19841 459
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with respect to bystanders probably stems from denial of a duty
to bystanders at the time the rule originated. 41
As the courts gradually recognized the harshness of the impact
rule with respect to direct victims, most began to allow recovery
if the direct victim suffered even the slightest impact. 42 As a
result, the impact rule failed to effectively screen legitimate from
feigned claims of emotional injury.43 This eventually led a
majority of jurisdictions to abandon the impact rule. 44 In its
place, the zone of physical danger test was developed. Despite
widespread abandonment of the impact rule, Illinois clung to
this nineteenth century theory until its recent decision in Rickey.
The Zone of Physical Danger Test
The concept of a zone of danger originated in the well-known
case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. 45 The traditional
notion of a zone of danger defines a physical area within which
the harmful consequences of a defendant's negligence may fore-
63 (1978); Kaiserman v. Bright, 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 377 N.E.2d 261 (1978); Neuberg v.
Michael Reese Hosp., 60 Ill. App. 3d 679,377 N.E.2d 215 (1978).
41. Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1970).
42. See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928)
(circus horse excreted into plaintiffs lap); Porter v. Delaware L. & W. R.R., 73 N.J.L- 405,
63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in plaintiffs eye); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d
351 (1961) (jostling occupants in auto collision).
43. Comment, Duty, Foreseeability, supra note 29, at 307-08. It is questionable, in fact,
whether the rule was ever effective. Physical impact bears little relation to the suffering
of emotional harm. For example, a near miIs may be just as frightening as a direct hit.
Pearson, supra note 7, at 488. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
44. Only a small minority of American jurisdictions retain the impact rule today. See,
e.g., Harrison v. Canada Dry Corp., 245 A.2d 642 (D.C. 1968); Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So.
2d 593 (Fla. 1974); Howard v. Bloodworth, 137 Ga. App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 122 (1976);
Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980); Gambill v. White, 303 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1957).
45. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). In PaIsgraf, the defendant's guard attempted to
aid a passenger in boarding a train. The passenger's package, which contained explo-
sives, fell to the ground and exploded in the process. The explosion caused a set of scales
at the other end of the platform to fall, striking the plaintiff. The court denied the plain-
tiffs cause of action, stating that
Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest, the violation of a right .... The plaintiff sues in her own right
for a wrong personally to her, and not as a vicarious beneficiary of a breach of
duty to another .... The passenger far away, if the victim of a wrong at all,
has a cause of action, not derivative, but original and primary. His claim to be
protected against invasion of his bodily security is neither greater nor less
because the act resulting in the invasion is a wrong to another far removed.
Id. at 341-43, 162 N.E. at 99-100.
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seeably occur.46 If the plaintiff is within the foreseeable realm of
physical injury, a duty of care arises on the part of the
defendant.47
In an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the
court presumes that a plaintiff within the zone of physical
danger anticipates bodily harm and thus fears for his own safety.48
This fear authenticates the plaintiffs emotional injuries. To
further verify the plaintiffs claim, the zone of physical danger
rule requires the plaintiff to demonstrate physical manifesta-
tions of his emotional injuries.49 The majority of jurisdictions
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts adhere to this rule.5°
The zone of physical danger test places fewer restrictions on
the direct victim's ability to recover than does the impact rule.5 1
Under the zone of physical danger test, a plaintiff may prevail
even where he has not experienced physical impact. The plain-
tiff, however, must be within the zone of physical danger created
by the defendant's negligence. Like the impact rule, the zone of
physical danger test does not allow recovery for emotional dis-
tress when it arises from fear for the safety of another.5 2 There-
fore, while the zone of physical danger test allows a greater like-
lihood of recovery for the direct victim, it still falls short of
providing effective relief to bystanders.53
Waube v. Warrington 4 is the leading case which explains the
policy considerations militating against bystander recovery under
the zone of physical danger test. In Waube, a mother witnessed
the defendant's automobile strike and kill her child. Since she
observed the accident from within her home, she was not within
the zone of physical danger and did not fear for her own safety.
The complaint alleged that the experience caused the mother to
suffer emotional distress, which ultimately led to her untimely
46. See Leibson, supra note 11, at 172; Simons, supra note 11, at 9.
47. See Liebson, supra note 11, at 172; Simons, supra note 11, at 9.
48. See Comment, Duty, Foreseeability, supra note 29, at 313; Comment, Dillon Revis-
ited: Toward a Better Paradigm for Bystander Cases, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 931, 932 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Dillon Revisited].
49. See Simons, supra note 11, at 12. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 436A
(1965).
50. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965); Annot., 29 A.LR.3d
1337 (1970).
51. See Leibson, supra note 11, at 172; Simons, supra note 11, at 9.
52. See Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 625(1957); Resavage v. Davies,
199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A-2d 728 (1968).
53. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
54. 216 Wis. 603,258 N.W. 497(1935).
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death only a few weeks later. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
refused to sustain the cause of action because the defendant had
not placed her in peril of physical injury.55 The court held that
unless the emotional injury results from the plaintiff's fear for
her own safety, it does not constitute a foreseeable result of the
defendant's negligence.56 Moreover, a finding of liability would
place an unreasonable burden upon users of the highways and
encourage a proliferation of fraudulent claims.57
Thirty-four years after the Waube decision, the New York
Court of Appeals reevaluated the efficacy of these policy argu-
ments under a substantially similar factual situation in Tobin v.
Grossman.58 It rejected the fear of fraudulent claims as a ground
for denying the mother's cause of action, reasoning that the
courts could rely upon the sophistication of the medical profes-
sion to weed out dishonest claims.59 Nor did it find that the
imposition of liability would lead to a proliferation of claims. A
plaintiff who had suffered a cognizable harm was entitled to a
remedy, despite the burdens placed on the courts.60 Additionally,
55. The court stated:
The right of the mother to recover must be based, first, upon the establishment
of a duty on the part of a defendant so to conduct herself with respect to the
child as not to subject the mother to an unreasonable risk of shock or fright,
and second, upon the recognition of a legally protected right or interest on the
part of the mother to be free from shock or fright occasioned by the peril of her
child.
Id. at 604, 258 N.W. at 497-98. Similarly, in Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 501
N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969), the court argued that to extend liability for injuries sustained by
bystanders not within the zone of danger would represent the creation of a new duty and
that no new technological, economic, or social developments existed which would warrant
recognition of a new cause of action. Id. at 615, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558. In Sinn v. Burd, 486
Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979), however, the court rejected this reasoning, contending that
the conduct of the defendant was of the type that had traditionally been held actionable.
Bystander recovery would only constitute a broadening of the scope of damages recog-
nized as flowing from that conduct. It further observed that developments in medical
science and psychiatry provided the impetus for expanding the scope of liability to
include recovery for bystander plaintiffs. Id. at 158-60, 404 A.2d at 678-79.
56. 216 Wis. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
57. Id.
58. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). In Tobin, the plaintiff
mother was inside a neighbor's home when she heard the screech of brakes. She imme-
diately went to the scene, which was only a few feet away, and saw her injured child
lying on the ground.
59. Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422,301 N.Y.S.2d at 558.
60. Id.
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the
expense of a flood of litigation; and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on
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the Tobin court acknowledged that a negligent tortfeasor could
reasonably foresee emotional harm to the mother of a child he
had physically injured.61
The Tobin case62 denied recovery, however, on two grounds.63
First, the court held that awarding damages to a bystander
plaintiff would be disproportionate to the culpability of the neg-
ligent tortfeasor. 64 Second, the court found that sustaining the
mother's cause of action would lead to unlimited liability.65 Ul-
timately, the scope of liability could encompass not only rela-
tives, but any affected eyewitness to the occurrence. 66
THE FORESEEABILITY STANDARD
In relatively recent times, a minority of jurisdictions have
attempted to accommodate policy considerations as well as the
bystander's interest in freedom from emotional distress. In so
doing, they have developed the foreseeability approach, a theory
the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon the grounds that it will give
the court too much work to do.
Prosser, supra note 24, at 877. Today, most courts do not consider the fear of opening the
floodgates to fraudulent claims a viable policy consideration. See, e.g., Sinn v. Burd, 486
Pa. 146, 160-63, 404 A.2d 672, 679-81 (1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 644-
45, 338 A.2d 524, 530 (1975). This policy consideration has also been advanced unsuccess-
fully at other times with respect to other developments in tort law. See, e.g., McPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1960) (regarding the imposition of strict
liability).
61. 24 N.Y.2d at 613, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
62. New York does not apply the zone of physical danger/fear for one's own safety
rule where, unlike the Tobin case, the plaintiff is not a bystander, but a direct victim.
Where the plaintiff is a direct victim, the courts will apply general negligence principles.
Compare Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 97 Misc. 2d 907, 412 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978)
(direct victim, plaintiff recovers) with Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64,
397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (bystander, no recovery).
63. The court in Tobin also noted that unduly burdensome liability would result in
terms of economics. The court stated that the constantly increasing costs of insurance
would eventually exceed the compulsory insurance liability limits. 24 N.Y.2d at 617, 249
N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559-60. The dissent attacked this view forcefully. Id. at 620,
249 N.E.2d at 429, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 562 (Keating, J., dissenting). It was also rejected in
Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 169, 404 A.2d 672, 684 (1979) and D'Ambra v. United States,
114 R.I. 643, 654, 338 A.2d 524, 530 (1975).
64. 24 N.Y.2d at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 557. "The risks of indirect
harm from loss or injury to loved ones is so pervasive and inevitably realized at one time
or another. Only a very small part of that risk is brought about by the culpable acts of
others. This is the risk of living and bearing children." Id.
65. Id. But see Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 168-70, 404 A.2d 672, 684 (1979) (application
of traditional tort concepts of liability will reasonably restrict the scope of liability).
66. 24 N.Y.2d at 611,249 N.E.2d at 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
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of recovery which proceeds from an entirely different premise
than the impact and zone of physical danger rules. Under the
foreseeability standard, courts recognize that the bystander's
emotional distress arises from the fear he suffers for the safety of
another. Since the development of the traditional theories of re-
covery, the medical profession has advanced in its study of emo-
tional trauma.6 7 These advances facilitate verification of the
plaintiff's emotional injuries.68 Consequently, the foreseeability
standard does not predicate liability on actual or anticipated
physical intrusions. Nor does the plaintiff s fear for his own bod-
ily safety have to authenticate his suffering of emotional distress.
Bystander Recovery-A Change in the Law
The foreseeability standard originated in the case of Dillon v.
Legg,69 in which a young girl died due to the defendant's negli-
gent operation of his automobile. The girl's mother and sister
witnessed the accident. The sister was within the zone of physi-
cal danger, but the mother was not. The California Supreme
Court held that both had stated a valid cause of action, however,
because a mother who sees her child killed will undoubtedly
suffer emotional distress whether or not she is herself in immi-
nent danger of bodily harm.70 Dillon thus refused to sanction a
rule which would preclude the mother's cause of action merely
because she stood a few yards distant from the accident.7 1
The Dillon court held that the bystander recovery issue should
be resolved by application of general negligence principles.7 2 To
this end, foreseeability would be the primary factor in determin-
ing whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the bystander
67. Medical science has shown that a traumatic stimulus, such as witnessing a tor-
tious injury, can cause a two-stage mental reaction. An individual may experience a
primary response that is essentially an automatic reaction which acts as a defense
mechanism to shield him from the traumatic event. Depending on the psychological and
physical makeup of the individual and the nature of the traumatic event, this response
may range from trivial to substantial. Not every individual who suffers a primary
response will suffer a secondary response. A secondary response results from the individ-
ual's inability to adjust to the traumatic event. It is generally longer in duration and
more amenable to objective verification. Comment, supra note 20, at 1238-54.
68. See Leibson, supra note 11, at 164; Comment, Dillon Revisited, supra note 48, at
940.
69. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912,69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
70. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
71. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
72. Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
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plaintiff.73 The court outlined three factors for determining fore-
seeability: proximity of the plaintiff to the scene of the accident;
shock resulting from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff
due to a sensory and contemporaneous observation of the acci-
dent; and a close relationship between the bystander and the
primary victim. 74 Dillon did not fix precise limits on the scope of
liability encompassed by the foreseeability standard.75 Rather, it
envisioned that such determinations would subsequently be made
on a case-by-case basis.76
Reinterpretations of the Dillon Formula
The Dillon decision was met by both warm welcome and sharp
criticism from the legal community.77 Despite its mixed reviews,
several jurisdictions have followed California's lead in recogniz-
ing emotional distress arising from fear for the safety of another
as a legally compensable harm.78 Over the last sixteen years,
the Dillon guidelines have undergone reformulation in Califor-
73. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79. The court, however, prefaced this
statement with the words "in the absence of overriding policy considerations." Id.
74. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
75. Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 581, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720,
726 (1976). Some have noted, however, that courts have so rigidly adhered to these three
guidelines that they have created a standard as artificial as the traditional theories of
recovery. See, e.g., Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 1 U. HAWAII L. REV. 1 (1979). This view,
however, may inhere from the fact that the cases do not extend liability to the full reach
of foreseeability, although foreseeability is the primary focus under the standard. Courts
have continued to weigh the interests of both parties to the action in denying recovery to
certain bystanders, instead resorting to legal fictions such as the impact and zone of
physical danger rules.
76. 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
77. Compare Leibson, supra note 11, at 180, with Miller, supra note 75, at 4. For cases
in which courts have expressly rejected Dillon, see Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249
N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Whetham v. Bismark Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D.
1972); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969). For courts which have
welcomed the Dillon decision, see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 598, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Barnhill v. Davis,
300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1980); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982);
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Toms v. McConnell, 45
Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980);
Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Sinn v. Brd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d
672 (1979); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973); Hunsley v. Giard, 87
Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1981). The lower courts of Connecticut are presently in
conflict over whether to adopt the foreseeability standard. Compare McGovern v. Piccolo,
33 Conn. Supp. 225, 373 A.2d 989 (1976) (rejecting the foreseeability standard) with
D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973) (embracing
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nia as well as in other jurisdictions. In applying the foreseeabil-
ity standard, the finding of an obligation to exercise due care has
largely depended upon the analysis of the facts of each particu-
lar case.79
The Relationship Factor
Dillon did not place more emphasis on the relationship factor
than upon any other guideline.80 Yet, the strong emotional at-
tachment between mother and child provided the impetus for
sustaining the bystander mother's cause of action in Dillon.8 1
Because the nature of the bystander's emotional injuries
directly corresponds to the degree of psychic attachment, 82 the
relationship factor places practical limits on liability and effec-
tively validates the bystander's claim for relief.
Generally, courts agree that a defendant should reasonably
foresee some type of emotional injury to those with a strong and
loving relationship with the primary victim. 8 3 Therefore, the
the foreseeability standard). The Supreme Court of Connecticut refused to take a stand on
the issue in Amodio v. Cunningham, 182 Conn. 80,438 A.2d 6 (1980).
The appellate courts of Texas are similarly split on the bystander recovery issue. Com-
pare Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (allowing recovery under the
foreseeability standard for fear the safety of another) with Dave-Snelling Lincoln-
Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (allowing recovery under the zone
of physical danger test for injuries sustained due to fear for one's own bodily safety and
for the fear for the safety of another). Most recently, the Texas Civil Court of Appeals, in
Sanchez v. Schlinder, 626 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), stated that it was inclined to
follow the foreseeability standard, but that given the factual situation before it, the plain-
tiff would still be unable to recover under the rule.
79. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d 912, 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 78
(1968), in which the court envisioned such a development in the law.
80. One court, however, noted that it is the most important of the Dillon guidelines. In
D'Ambra v. United States, 114 RI. 643,338 A.2d 524 (1975), the court stated that personal
relationships may link people together more tightly, if less tangibly, than any mere phys-
ical and chronological proximity. Id. at 656-57, 338 A.2d at 531.
81. As Prosser has stated, where a mother suffers emotional distress due to injury to
her child, all ordinary human feelings are in favor of her action against the negligent
tortfeasor. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 334. Yet, it has also been noted that it is not
enough to allow a cause of action based upon the sympathy inherent in the mother's
case. From the plaintiff's perspective, the goal of tort law is to restore the plaintiff to her
pre-accident condition. Yet, monetary compensation is least likely to offset the pain in the
case of a mother or close relative caused by the irreplaceability of the victim. Only in a
society that views money as an adequate substitute for the loss of a loved one would a
bystander recovery rule find justification in the pain offset analysis. Pearson, supra note
7, at 501-03.
82. Comment, Dillon Revisited, supra note 48, at 942.
83. Cases subsequent to Dillon show that the courts will look to the substance, rather
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relationship factor has presented the least number of problems
in cases subsequent to Dillon, because most have involved par-
ental, spousal, or sibling relationships8 4 Courts have uniformly
held that these affiliations are sufficiently close to sustain a by-
stander's cause of action.
Observation and Location Requirements
Even if the bystander bears a close relationship to the victim,
he may not recover unless he was near enough in time and dis-
tance to observe the accident.8 5 Under the foreseeability stand-
ard, the court does not examine whether the defendant placed
the bystander in apprehension of physical injury. Rather, con-
temporaneous observation and location at the scene indicate
that the plaintiff suffered a direct emotional impact.8 6
The manner in which the bystander observes the injury to the
primary victim constitutes one facet of the court's inquiry. In the
Dillon case, the mother visually witnessed the accident. Subse-
quent decisions, however, have not always required visual per-
ception to trigger liability.8 7 Courts have also permitted recovery
than the legal form, of the relationship involved. For example, in Leong v. Takasaki, 55
Hawaii 398, 530 P.2d 758 (1974), the court stated that the absence of a blood relationship
should not foreclose recovery. It thus upheld the claim of a young boy who had witnessed
the death of his stepfather's mother. In Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976), the plaintiff's three year old foster son died from a
negligent injection of a dangerous intravenous solution. The child had lived with the
plaintiffs family since the age of five months and had treated the plaintiff as his true
mother. The court stated that it would look to the emotional attachments, not the legal
status, of the family relationship in determining foreseeability. Id. at 582, 127 Cal. Rptr.
at 726. The court ruled that the relationship possessed all the incidents of parent and
child except those flowing as a matter of law. Therefore, it upheld the foster mother's
claim. Id. But see Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980) (no
recovery for de facto spouse).
84. E.g., Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1980) (plaintiff: son; victim: mother);
Austin v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1979) (plain-
tiff: father; victim: unborn child); Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137
Cal. Rptr. 864 (1977) (plaintiff: husband; victim: wife); Landreth v. Reed, 520 S.W.2d 486
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (plaintiff: sister, victim: sister).
85. The court in D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975), was of
the opinion that the zone of physical danger test is merely a matrix of the observation
and location factors. Id. at 656, 338 A.2d at 531.
86. One commentator has noted that the Dillon standard proposed an emotional zone
of danger test. Comment, Dillon Revisited, supra note 48, at 937.
87. Courts have also held, however, that mere presence at the scene will not necessar-
ily meet the sensory perception requirement. In Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565
P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977), the court denied recovery to an expectant father who
had been in his wife's delivery room when their child died. The court stated that the event
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where the bystander heard the accident. 88 A bystander's cause
of action has also succeeded under a theory of constructive
observation.8 9
Courts also examine the subject of the bystander's observa-
tion. As a general rule, the bystander must observe the death or
serious bodily injury of the primary victim.90 Jurisdictions are
split as to whether the bystander must witness the tortious act
as well as its harmful consequences. In Dillon, the court did not
draw such a distinction because the mother witnessed the defend-
ant's car strike her daughter and the child's resulting injuries.91
The question of where and when the bystander makes the
observation bears directly on what he perceives.92 Some jurisdic-
of birth, by its very nature, is hidden. Therefore, the plaintiff could not have seen or
otherwise sensed that the baby had died. Id. at 584-85, 565 P.2d at 135-36, 139 Cal. Rptr.
at 110-11. In Austin v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420
(1979), however, the court allowed recovery to an expectant father who alleged he had felt
the death of his child by feeling his wife's body. The court distinguished Justus, stating
that in that case, the plaintiff had not suffered emotional distress until after he was
informed by the staff that his child had died. Id. at 358, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22. In
Austin, however, the plaintiff had learned of his child's death by his own sensory obser-
vation of the cessation of life in the child. Id.
88. E.g., Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1977); Hunsley v. Giard, 87
Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1095 (1981). In Corso, the plaintiff heard the impact of the defend-
ant's car upon her daughter's body from an open window in her kitchen, which was only
yards away from the street. In Hunsley, the plaintiff heard the defendant's car crash into
the side of her home while she was in another room.
89. Comment, Dillon Revisited, supra note 48, at 944. For example, in Krouse v. Gra-
ham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1979), the plaintiff husband
remained inside the parked car while his wife unloaded groceries from the rear seat. The
defendant's car suddenly approached from behind at a high rate of speed, and collided
with the wife. The husband alleged that he had perceived that his wife had been struck
although he did not actually see the collision. The husband alleged that he had known of
his wife's position just prior to the accident, and that he had also realized as the other car
approached that she would be hit. The court ruled that the husband was a percipient
witness. Id. at 76, 562 P.2d 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
Courts have denied recovery, however, in instances of alleged extrasensory perception.
In Burke v. Pan Am. World Airways, 484 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), for example, a
New York district court, applying California law, denied damages to a twin sister who
alleged she had extrasensorily perceived her twin's death in an air crash. The plaintiff
had been in California at the time of the accident, which occurred in Spain. See also
Hoffner v. Hedge, 47 Pa. 277, 407 A.2d 940 (1979) (no recovery for twin sister).
90. Most bystanders do in fact allege this. In Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa
1980), the court, drawing from an Iowa criminal law statute, defined serious injury as
bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious disfigure-
ment or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Id.
at 108.
91. See Comment, Dillon Revisited, supra note 48, at 944.
92. Generally, where the contemporaneity requirement is met, the location factor is
also satisfied. Comment, An Expanding Legal Duty: The Recovery of Damages for Men-
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tions have granted relief to plaintiffs who rush to the scene of
the accident to see the injured victim only moments after the
occurrence.93 These courts reason that the emotional impact of
seeing a severely injured body only moments after an accident is
just as profound as if the bystander had witnessed the accident
itself.94 These decisions have thus expanded upon the Dillon
guidelines by requiring only fairly contemporaneous observation.95
Accordingly, in these jurisdictions, the plaintiff need not witness
the defendant's negligent act to recover.
Conversely, other jurisdictions do require a bystander to wit-
ness the injury-producing event itself.96 In order to recover, the
plaintiff must be at the scene when the accident occurs. 97 This
more restrictive approach stems from a desire to keep bystander
recovery within strict limits.98
Under this approach, the tortious act must be capable of actual
tal Anguish by Those Observing Tortious Activity, 19 Am. Bus. LJ. 214, 223 (1981).
93. For example, in Landreth v. Reed, 520 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), the court
allowed recovery where a girl witnessed attempts to resuscitate her younger sister as well
as her sister's death. The court stated that she had been brought so close to the reality of
the accident as to render her experience an integral part of it. Id. at 490. In Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978), the court allowed a plaintiff to recover
based on the fact that he had arrived on the scene while the injured victim was still there.
In Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980), the court
extended recovery to plaintiffs who first witnessed the injured victim at the hospital some
time after the accident. The court stated that a plaintiff who rushes onto the accident
scene has no greater right to recover than one who rushes instead to the hospital. Id. at
518, 413 N.E.2d at 697.
94. E.g., Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725
(1969).
95. Fairly contemporaneous observation does not mean that a bystander who is
nowhere near the scene or who only learns of the accident several hours later from a
third party can recover. E.g., Gustafson v. Faris, 67 Mich. App. 363, 241 N.W.2d 208
(1976) (no recovery for mother who arrives at scene shortly after son dies from wounds
inflicted by negligent motorist); Yandrich v. Radic, 495 Pa. 243, 433 A.2d 459 (1981) (no
recovery for father who goes to scene of accident only to learn his son has already been
taken to the hospital).
96. In fact, in voicing its concern regarding unlimited liability, the court in Tobin v.
Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419,301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969), predicted that liability
would eventually be extended to include a bystander who rushed onto the scene. The
California courts initially took this approach. E.g., Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). California now requires the plaintiff to witness the
tortious act itself, however, this limiting Archibald's impact. See infra note 97 and
accompanying text.
97. See Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506,146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978) (court
denied recovery where plaintiffs arrive at scene of accident as dust was settling); Arauz v.
Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977) (court denied recovery where
mother arrived at scene five minutes later).
98. Comment, Dillon Revisited, supra note 48, at 945.
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observation. For example, in Dillon, a bystander prevailed
where she observed the auto collision which injured her child.99
Yet, courts have denied damages where a defendant doctor has
made an erroneous medical diagnosis.100 Furthermore, the event
must be brief and sudden,10 presumably because where the
primary victim's health gradually deteriorates over a long period
of time, the bystander can better prepare himself emotionally. 02
The Requirement of Physical Manifestations
Jurisdictions have differed in their determinations regarding
the contemporaneous observation and location guidelines. The
cases, however, generally evidence a commitment by the courts
to avoiding unduly burdening the defendant while affording the
bystander redress for his injuries. As one additional safeguard
against unlimited liability, the Dillon court confined its ruling to
cases where the plaintiff displays physical manifestations of his
emotional distress. 0 3 Historically, courts have looked to a plain-
tiff's resultant physical manifestations as a means of verifying
his emotional injuries. 0 4 The majority of jurisdictions which fol-
99. 68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912,69 Cal. Rptr. 72.
100. E.g., Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 883 (1973). In this case the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had negligently
diagnosed and treated her daughter. The court denied recovery because a layman could
not have perceived an event such as an erroneous diagnosis. Further, the Dillon decision
contemplated a sudden and brief event which the plaintiff must actually witness. Thus,
the mother could not recover for witnessing her daughter's progressive decline in health
and ultimate death. Id. at 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
101. Id. at 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
102. Comment, Dillon Revisited, supra note 48, at 946.
103. 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 313(1)(b), 436A comment b (1965); Com-
ment, supra note 20, at 1244. There are two historical exceptions to the physical manifes-
tations requirement. The rule does not apply in cases involving negligently handled
corpses or graves, nor to the negligent forwarding of telegraphic messages. See generally,
Comment, Duty, Foreseeability, supra note 29, at 310-11 (discussion and collection of
cases involving these two exceptions). The Court of Appeals of New York, which had
refused in Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969), to
expand liability by adopting the foreseeability standard, nevertheless allowed a plaintiff
to recover for mental suffering incurred when the defendant's hospital erroneously
informed her by telegram that her mother had died. Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334
N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975). One commentator has noted that although the court
of appeals distinguished Tobin on the ground that the bystander had suffered only indi-
rectly while the recipient of the telegram in Johnson was directly injured, it is likely that
the more important difference was that the potential number of plaintiffs was limited in
Johnson, but not in Tobin. Miller, supra note 75, at 9.
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low the foreseeability standard also adhere to this view.105
Because the medical profession now possesses a better under-
standing of emotional trauma, the importance of authentication
in this matter has diminished. 10 6 Having acknowledged that
other methods of verification exist, a minority of jurisdictions
have abrogated the physical manifestations requirement as an
essential element of the bystander's cause of action. 07 To min-
imize the possibility of fraudulent claims, they have shifted their
focus to the quality of the bystander's injuries, only permitting
recovery for serious emotional distress. 08 To this end, some
courts have raised the standard of proof and will only award
damages where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would
be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engen-
dered by the circumstances of that case.109
105. Even these jurisdictions, however, are now beginning to focus upon the severity
and quality of the plaintiff's emotional injuries, rather than concentrating solely on their
physical effects. See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); D'Ambra v.
United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975). In Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104
(Iowa 1981), the court developed an objective standard against which to assess the plain-
tiff's emotional injuries. The court stated that it would only permit recovery if, in addition
to exhibiting resultant physical manifestations, the plaintiff actually believed that the
victim would be seriously injured or killed and that a reasonable man, similarly situated,
would reasonably have believed that the victim would be seriously injured or killed.
106. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Culbert v. Samp-
son's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672
(1979).
108. E.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980). The court noted that the requirement of physical manifestations only encour-
ages extravagant pleadings and distorted testimony. Id. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 838. Further, many courts which impose this requirement will permit recovery
even where the plaintiff alleges trivial physical injuries. Id. The court concluded that the
plaintiff should only be required to prove the severity of his emotional distress. In so
doing, the jurors could determine from their own experiences whether the plaintiff had
suffered compensable emotional injury. In addition, the plaintiffs claim could be verified
through expert medical testimony. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
109. The forerunner in this area is Hawaii. In Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472
P.2d 509 (1970), the court developed the "ability to cope" test, shifting to the trier of fact
the responsibility for determining whether liability should be limited. Miller, supra note
75, at 7. Rodrigues had involved a claim of emotional distress caused by the negligent
damage to their property. Subsequently, in Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d
758 (1974), the court reaffirmed the principles set forth in Rodrigues in a bystander's case.
The court made it clear that the factors set forth in Dillon v. Legg to determine foresee-
ability and duty would not be used by the trial court to bar recovery, but would only be
relevant in determining whether the amount of stress engendered was beyond that with
which a reasonable person could be expected to cope. Miller, supra note 75, at 8. In Kelley
v. Kokua Sales & Supply, 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975), however, the court denied
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Under the foreseeability standard, a growing number of juris-
dictions have recognized a bystander's interest in emotional
tranquility as a legally protected right. They have also employed
more flexible and realistic guidelines to assess a bystander's
cause of action than jurisdictions which follow the traditional
theories of recovery. Against the backdrop of these significant
developments in the law of torts, the Illinois Supreme Court was
called upon in Rickey to reevaluate the viability of its precedent
governing negligent infliction of emotional distress causes of
action.
RICKEY V. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY
The Facts
On February 12, 1972, Robert Rickey, age eight, witnessed the
near death by strangulation of his younger brother Richard, age
five.110 The brothers had just descended a subway escalator
owned and operated by the Chicago Transit Authority."'
Richard's clothing became entangled in a mechanism at the
escalator's base, trapping him in the mechanism and choking
him.11 2 Richard's inability to breathe for a substantial period of
time rendered him comatose. His comatose condition now requires
his permanent confinement in a nursing care facility.113
Robert Rickey, through his mother Janet, brought suit against
the Chicago Transit Authority under a cause of action sounding
in negligence.11 4 The complaint alleged that as a result of wit-
nessing his brother nearly strangle to death, Robert had suffered
severe emotional distress which became manifest in physical
injuries. 11 5 The complaint did not allege that Robert had suf-
recovery to a bystander plaintiff because the plaintiff had not been located within a
reasonable distance of the scene of the accident. The plaintiff had suffered a heart attack
and died shortly after being informed of the deaths of his daughter and granddaughter in
Hawaii. He had learned of the accident, however, over the telephone in his home in
California.
110. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 11. 2d 546,549, 457 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1983).
111. Id. at 549, 457 N.E.2d at 1. Otis Elevator Co. had designed, manufactured, and
sold the escalator to the Chicago Transit Authority ("CTA"). Midland Elevator Co. had
contracted with the CTA to inspect its escalators. In 1971, Midland merged with the U.S.
Elevator Co.
112. Id. at 549,457 N.E.2d at 2.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 548, 457 N.E.2d at 1. Rickey sought recovery from Midland and U.S. Eleva-
tor. He also brought a products liability claim against Otis Elevator Co.
115. Id. at 550, 457 N.E.2d at 2. The complaint alleged that the emotional distress had
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fered a physical impact at the time of the occurrence, nor did it
allege that Robert had been in danger of physical harm. 11 6
The Lower Courts
At trial, the circuit court dismissed the complaint with preju-
dice, stating that no cause of action existed for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress absent a contemporaneous physi-
cal impact. 117 The Illinois Appellate Court, however, abandoned
Illinois precedent requiring physical impact." 8 In so doing, the
appellate court held that Robert Rickey had stated a valid cause
of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress under
the foreseeablity standard." 9 The court noted that ordinarily it
is improper for an appellate court to deviate from prior state
supreme court decisions. 120 The court felt, however, that the his-
tory of the impact rule and the development of alternatives to
that rule necessitated a reevaluation of Illinois law.' 2'
The Illinois Supreme Court
The Illinois Supreme Court found the appellate court's imple-
mentation of the foreseeability standard improper.122 The court
held that the zone of physical danger test constituted the appro-
priate alternative to the impact rule.123 It then remanded the
become manifest in physical injury, including "definite functional, emotional, psychia-
tric, and behavioral disorders, extreme depression, prolonged and continuing mental dis-
turbances, inability to attend school and engage in gainful employment and to engage in
his usual and customary affairs." Id.
116. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 101 Ill. App. 3d 439, 440, 428 N.E.2d 596, 597
(1981)
117. 98 Ill. 2d at 548-49, 457 N.E.2d at 1-2.
118. 101 II. App. 3d at 441-42, 428 N.E.2d at 598-99.
119. Id. at 442-43, 428 N.E.2d at 599. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint as to Otis Elevator Co. on Rickey's strict liability claim, but reversed and
remanded the case with respect to the other defendants.
120. Id. at 441, 428 N.E.2d at 598.
121. Id.
122. The appellate court had denied applications by the CTA and U.S. Elevator Co.
for a certificate of importance to the Illinois Supreme Court. The supreme court granted
and consolidated the petitions for leave to appeal of the CTA and U.S. Elevator Co. 98
Ill. 2d at 549, 457 N.E.2d at 2. The supreme court noted in its opinion that had petitions
for leave to appeal not been filed, the appellate court's decision would have stood without
challenge, in contradiction to Illinois' consistent application of the supreme court's
upholding the impact rule decision in Braun v. Craven, 175 11. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898). 98
Ill. 2d at 552, 457 N.E.2d at 3.
123. 981I1. 2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
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case to allow Rickey to plead consistently with the zone of physi-
cal danger test.124
The court initially examined Illinois precedent requiring a con-
temporaneous physical impact in order for a bystander to re-
cover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Justice
Ward, writing for the court, noted that Illinois had consistently
denied bystander recovery under the impact rule.125 He further
observed that most jurisdictions no longer require a contempo-
raneous physical impact in order to sustain a cause of action, 126
because such a requirement can be satisfied by trivial physical
contacts which bear little relation to the harm suffered by the
plaintiff.127 For example, a plaintiff can satisfy the requirement
with even the slightest impact, such as dust in the eye.1 28 The
court thus concluded that abandonment of the impact rule in
Illinois would be the appropriate course of action.1 29
In determining which theory of recovery would replace the
impact rule, the supreme court turned to the appellate court's
decision. The appellate court had adopted a standard similar to
that enunciated in Dillon v. Legg. 30 The lower court's theory
differed from Dillon, however, because the latter had pertained to
a case in which the plaintiff suffered shock resulting in physical
injuries,' 3' while the appellate court's opinion permitted recovery
for emotional distress alone. 132 Courts have expressed reluctance
124. Id. at 556, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
125. Id. at 550, 457 N.E.2d at 2. See also Kaiserman v. Bright, 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 377
N.E.2d 261 (1978). In Kaiserman, the defendant taxicab driver struck a young boy who
had just alighted from a school bus. The force of the impact caused the boy's body to be
thrown across the street and into his own front yard. The boy's family rushed out into
the yard upon hearing the screeching of brakes. There, the family discovered the boy,
who was severely injured. The boy died in his father's arms only moments later. The
court refused to sustain the plaintiffs causes of action. Relying on Braun, the court stated
that no action would lie for the negligent infliction of emotional distress absent a con-
temporaneous physical impact. Id. at 71, 377 N.E. 2d at 264. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
126. 98 M1. 2d at 533, 457 N.E.2d at 4. See supra notes 43, 44, and accompanying text.
127. 98 Ill. 2d at 533, 457 N.E.2d at 4.
128. Id. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
129. 98 11. 2d at 554, 457 N.E.2d at 4.
130. Id. See also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
131. 98 M1. 2d at 554,457 N.E.2d at 4.
132. Id. It is not clear that the appellate court abrogated the resultant physical mani-
festations requirement. The court stated, "We believe that the plaintiffs allegations
regarding the consequences of his distress are sufficient to establish a real, compensable
injury as opposed to a mere temporary fright." 101 Ill. App. 3d at 443,428 N.E.2d at 599.
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to award damages for purely emotional distress based on policy
considerations such as the fear of fraudulent claims, the diffi-
culty in ascertaining damages, and the potential for encouraging
frivolous litigation. 133 The supreme court thus declined to adopt
the lower court's theory because of the difficulty inherent in
authenticating the plaintiffs emotional injuries without result-
ant physical manifestations. 134 Instead, the court announced
that Illinois would join the majority of jurisdictions which follow
the zone of physical danger test,135 in which a bystander within
the zone of physical danger who fears for his own safety because
of the defendant's negligence states a valid cause of action for
physical injuries resulting from emotional distress' 3 6
Under the facts alleged, however, the court found no clear
indication of whether Rickey could recover under the zone of
physical danger test. The complaint did not allege that the
defendant's negligence had endangered Rickey so that he feared
for his own safety. 3 7 Nor did it reveal Rickey's position at the
time of the accident. 138 The facts did demonstrate, however, that
Rickey had manifested physical symptoms of his emotional dis-
tress. 3 9 Therefore, the supreme court remanded the case so that
Rickey could plead under the zone of physical danger test.140
The complaint did allege resultant physical manifestations. See supra note 116 and
accompanying text. The supreme court, however based much of its rejection of the fore-
seeability standard on this assumption. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
133. 98 Ill. 2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5. Courts have also advanced these policy consid-
erations to bar direct victims' causes of action and those of bystander plaintiffs. See
supra notes 2, 55-66, and accompanying text.
134. 98 1M. 2d at 554, 457 N.E.2d at 4.
135. Id. at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5. The court cited Pennsylvania, as illustrated in the
case of Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970), as one of the jurisdictions
which follows the zone of physical danger rule. Niederman was overruled nearly five
years ago, however, in Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). Pennsylvania now
follows the foreseeability standard.
136. 98 Ill. 2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
137. Id. at 556, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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ANALYSIS
The Zone of Danger Rule:
An Extension of the Impact Rule
The Rickey decision marks Illinois' justified abandonment of
the long-suffered impact rule. Where the plaintiff receives a
slight jolt or a speck of dust in the eye, no guarantee exists that
he has suffered more than a fleeting instance of fright or other
emotional disturbance. The law cannot be expected to compen-
sate for every minor upset incurred in daily living.41 The Illinois
Supreme Court found this sufficient justification to abandon the
impact rule. Additional reasons exist, however, which make the
abrogation of the requirement of a contemporaneous physical
impact both desirable and necessary.
Under the impact rule, courts have diminished the value of
society's interest in emotional tranquility. By predicating liability
on physical impact, only indirect protection is afforded to the
gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint, that his right to be free
from emotional distress has been violated. A plaintiff might just
as well bring a conventional negligence action for personal
injuries,142 since he may recover parasitic damages, characterized
as pain and suffering, under that cause of action. 143
Furthermore, the impact rule virtually bars recovery to a
plaintiff who suffers emotional distress when viewing the tor-
tious injury of another.144 In a bystander's cause of action, how-
ever, physical impact bears little relation to the suffering of emo-
tional distress. 45 Moreover, the impact rule fails to recognize
fear for the safety of another as a legally compensable harm. 146
The significance of Illinois' departure from the impact rule is
diminished when viewed in light of its adoption of the zone of
141. Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1981); D'Ambra v. United States,
114 RI. 643, 653,338 A.2d 524, 528 (1975).
142. See Comment, Dillon Revisited, supra note 48, at 933.
143. See Pearson, supra note 7, at 486-88.
144. Ellsworth v. Massacar, 215 Mich. 511, 184 N.W. 408 (1921); Knaub v. Gotwalt,
422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966). See also supra note 39.
145. See Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982) (mother fears
for the safety of her child who chokes on a foreign substance negligently left in a jar of
baby food); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (young girl fears for
the safety of her infant sister who has fallen into a swimming pool).
146. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Where the plaintiff can prove that there
was some impact, however, some courts will allow recovery for emotional distress due in
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physical danger test. The zone of physical danger test is no more
than an extension of the impact rule. By similarly emphasizing
the physical inviolability of the plaintiff, the rule fails to afford
direct protection to the plaintiff's interest in emotional
tranquility.147
In addition, like the impact rule, the zone of physical danger
test is illogical when applied in a bystander's cause of action.148
A bystander suffers emotional harm because of perception of the
tortious injury of the primary victim. The functioning of the by-
stander's audiovisual senses, the conduits through which he per-
ceives the occurrence, do not depend upon his imminent proxim-
ity to the defendant's act.149 The bystander may be located
outside of the zone of immediate physical danger and yet witness
very vividly the primary victim's injury, thereby suffering emo-
tional distress. 150 Moreover, even proponents of the zone of phys-
ical danger test recognize that observation of the death or serious
injury of a close family member may foreseeably engender gen-
uine and severe emotional injuries.' 5 ' Courts nonetheless con-
tinue to preclude recovery under this theory. 152
part to fear for the safety of another. E.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Robinett, 151 Ky.
778, 152 S.W. 778 (1913).
147. Under the zone of physical danger rule, a negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress action is analogous to the tort of assault. In each action, the plaintiff suffers emo-
tional injury. Yet, to recover, the defendant must have placed the plaintiff in apprehen-
sion of an imminent harmful physical contact. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
148. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 564,380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (1978).
149. Simons, supra note 11, at 10.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969).
152. In two cases, courts have allowed recovery under the zone of physical danger rule
where the plaintiffs emotional injuries were due in part to fear for his own bodily safety.
In Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), a
mother brought a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress after witnessing her
son fall out of a moving automobile as a result of a defective lock in the back door. The
court stated that the mother had also been imperiled by the defective lock and thus must
have feared for her own safety. In Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1953),
the plaintiff was looking out of his front window when the defendant negligently drove
his truck into the plaintiff's home. The plaintiff alleged that he feared not only for his
safety, but for the safety of his wife and children, and had thus suffered emotional dis-
tress. The court stated that the defendant had placed the plaintiff in imminent danger
which resulted in fear for both himself and his family and that it would grant recovery
because the shock sustained by the plaintiff was the same whether it arose from fear for
himself or another.
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The Requirement of Physical Manifestations:
Clouding the Issue of Proof
In adopting the zone of physical danger rule, the Illinois
Supreme Court did not discuss the rule's substantive merits or
faults. Nor did it analyze the foreseeability standard, which it
rejected. The only explicit reason the court gave for adopting the
zone of physical danger test was that it could not accept the
appellate court's interpretation of the foreseeability standard.153
The supreme court perceived that the lower court's theory
would permit recovery absent resultant physical manifestations
of the plaintiffs emotional injuries, 15 4 in spite of the fact that
the complaint alleged such physical injuries. 155 If the basis of
the Rickey court's decision is solely its desire to retain the physi-
cal manifestation requirement, it is difficult to comprehend why
the court refused to adopt the foreseeability standard.
The majority of jurisdictions which follow the foreseeability
standard retain this element as a prerequisite to bystander
recovery.15 6 The court did not acknowledge this fact in its opin-
ion. Even though the appellate court's interpretation of the fore-
seeability standard apparently did not include the physical man-
ifestations requirement, the supreme court could nonetheless
have adopted the foreseeability standard and yet retained
that element.
Moreover, rejection of the physical manifestations requirement
would not, as the supreme court feared, 157 have prompted recov-
ery for purely emotional distress or exacerbated the difficulties in
proving plaintiffs' claims. The medical profession has proven
that purely emotional distress, without accompanying physical
manifestations, does not exist. 58 Scientific studies have shown
that the physical and psychic components of emotional distress
153. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. See also supra note 152.
155. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107-08 (Iowa 1981); Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 568, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (1978); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich.
App. 647, 649, 207 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1973); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 659, 406 A.2d
300, 310 (1979); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
157. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
158. See Leibson, supra note 11, at 164; Comment, supra note 20, at 1249.
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are inextricably intertwined a159 Courts have clung to the historic
distinction between the physical and the psychic, however,
thus requiring the plaintiff to prove resultant physical
manifestations.160
Rather than providing a means of weeding out false claims,
the law's distinction between the physical and psychic compo-
nents of emotional distress clouds the issue of proof.16' Under
the foreseeability standard, a minority of jurisdictions have rec-
ognized the artificiality of this distinction, and thus abrogated
the requirement of physical manifestations as an essential ele-
ment of the negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of
action. 62 These courts do continue to view such physical symp-
toms as admissible evidence of the plaintiff's claim. 63 They
have placed greater reliance on expert medical testimony and
the experience of the jury, however, in assessing the authenticity
of a plaintiffs injuries. 16 4 By refusing to allow recovery except in
cases of serious emotional injury, these jurisdictions more effec-
tively circumscribe liability and assure meritorious claims with-
out resort to artificial legal distinctions. To the extent that these
jurisdictions have created alternatives to the resultant physical
manifestations requirement, 65 it appears that the Illinois Su-
preme Court need not have foundered on the difficulties inherent
in the efficient administration of bystander claims when choos-
ing an alternative to the impact rule. The Rickey court could
have adopted the foreseeability standard without the require-
ment of resultant physical manifestations, and implemented
other feasible mechanisms to ensure the validity of the bystand-
er's emotional distress.
159. Leibson, supra note 11, at 164; Comment, supra note 20, at 1249.
160. E.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398,404,520 P.2d 758,762-63 (1974).
161. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 929-30, 616 P.2d 813,
821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 159-60, 404 A.2d 672, 679
(1979).
162. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. In adopting the "ability to cope" test, some courts employ a standard similar
to that applied in actions for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. See RE.
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 46 comment j (1965). Generally, plaintiffs are not required
to exhibit resultant physical manifestations as an essential element of their causes of
action under that tort. See Comment, supra note 24, at 626-29. This can be attributed to a
large extent to the fact that the severity of the defendant's conduct vouches for the exist-
ence of the plaintiff's emotional injuries. Id. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text. In its decision in Rickey, the appellate court noted that because Illinois courts have
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BYSTANDER RECOVERY-AN ALTERNATIVE
SOLUTION
The Rickey decision recognizes a bystander's right to recover
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. By adopting the
zone of physical danger rule, however, the Illinois Supreme
Court has so limited the scope of liability that it has actually
placed bystanders in no better position to recover than under the
impact rule. When announcing that Illinois would follow the
zone of physical danger test, the court cited case precedent from
various jurisdictions which follow the rule; in each case cited, the
bystander had not prevailed.166
Weighing the Policy Considerations
When addressing the bystander recovery issue, most courts
have focused on the various policy considerations underlying the
extension of a common law tort duty to bystanders. The majority
of the policy considerations traditionally advanced no longer jus-
tify denial of bystander recovery.
Both advocates and opponents of bystander recovery agree
that the fear that courts will be exposed to a flood of fraudulent
claims is unfounded. 167 A potential increase in the courts' case-
loads should not justify rejection of an entire class of claims. 68
Moreover, advances in medical science now minimize the ability
to recover for trivial or feigned instances of emotional injury.169
Reliance on expert medical testimony and the integrity of the
judicial system provide better solutions for verifying plaintiffs'
claims than adherence to theories of recovery created nearly a
century ago to cope with then existing difficulties in proof.170
already been involved in the task of weeding out dishonest claims relating to emotional
distress under the intentional infliction cause of action, abandonment of the impact rule
would not lead to problems of proof in a negligent infliction of emotional distress case.
101 Ill. App. 3d at 442-43, 428 N.E.2d at 598-99.
166. See, e.g., Owens v. Childrens Memorial Hosp., 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973) (apply-
ing Neb. law); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Stadler v.
Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419,
301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972);
Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969).
167. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
168. See Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 392, 412, 261 A.2d 84, 89 (1970).
169. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961),
where, in abandoning the impact rule, the court stated that it would prefer to rely upon
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Today, both medical science and changing societal values
require expanded legal recognition of the consequences of de-
fendants' negligent acts. 171 The increasing density of the Amer-
ican population and the modem trend of urbanization have
made serious invasions of an individual's psychological well-
being more likely.172 In addition, there is now recognition of the
debilitating effects mental distress may have on an individual's
ability to carry on the functions of life. 173 Both critics and advo-
cates of bystander recovery no longer deem emotional distress
which arises from witnessing the tortious injury of another a
remote or unforeseeable result of a defendant's wrongdoing. 174
Some courts continue to argue, however, that to impose liabil-
ity upon the negligent tortfeasor is wholly disproportionate to his
moral culpability. 75 One commentator has even contended that
in our increasingly complex society, a toughening of the mental
hide will provide better protection than the law ever can. 76
Although the law should not compensate for every minor shock
incurred in daily living, there must be some point at which an
injured party can vindicate his right to be free from emotional
distress. The more interwoven societal relations become, the
the integrity of the judicial system, the concern of the juries, the efficacy of the rules of
evidence, and the competence of medical expert testimony. Id. at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731-
32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
171. "The force which compels recognition of an element of damages, once parasitic,
as an independent basis of liability is social change." Rodrigues v. State, 55 Hawaii 156,
173-74, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970) (citing 11. STREET, supra note 20, at 470).
172. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
173.
In our increasingly complex society, the orderly and normal functioning of a
man's mind is as critical to his well-being as physical health. Indeed, a sound
mind within a disabled body can accomplish much, while a disabled mind in
the soundest of bodies is rarely capable of making any substantial contribution
to society.
Comment, supra note 20, at 1237.
174. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
176. Magruder, supra note 17, at 1035. Under this view, it might seem extravagant
and unnecessary to compensate victims of mental suffering.
It should also be noted that the effect of litigation itself may possibly contribute to and
intensify the plaintiffs mental reaction. See Comment, supra note 20, at 1261. But see
Leibson, supra note 11, at 194, wherein the author notes that the burden on the negligent
defendant is minimal because only those who suffer abnormal reactions or severe emo-
tional distress over the death or serious injury of a loved one are the plaintiffs about
whom litigation in this area has centered. Most others would probably not consider the
time and expense of a lawsuit or the reawakening of sad memories worth the cost. Id. See
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greater the responsibility one must accept for his conduct. 177
The most crucial point about which courts differ lies in where
to limit liability, if indeed bystander recovery is to be recognized.
In Rickey, the Illinois Supreme Court chose to remain within
traditionally recognized areas of tort responsibility. By adopting
the zone of physical danger rule, the court has reflected its desire
to maintain predictable determinations of liability in a field of
tort law clouded by numerous gray areas. Had the Rickey court
gone one step further and adopted the foreseeability standard,
however, Illinois would have had more flexible, realistic guide-
lines with which to make case-by-case determinations of
liability.178
The foreseeability standard validly limits the scope of compen-
sable plaintiffs to close family members. 179 A bystander who
has no relation to the primary victim is not likely to suffer com-
pensable emotional injury.180 An unrelated eyewitness will most
often suffer a fleeting instance of sorrow or pity for the primary
victim. 8 1 On the other hand, a close family member may rea-
sonably be anticipated to suffer feelings of severe shock or grief.182
Such emotional reactions are not only more objectively verifia-
ble,183 but also much more deserving of redress in a court of law.
Furthermore, the foreseeability standard reflects the fact that the
law cannot compensate every family member who suffers the
generally Miller, supra note 76 (regarding the need for proportionality in the awarding of
damages for emotional distress in a negligence action).
177. Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 164,404 A.2d 672, 681 (1979).
178. In Robert Rickey's case, to recover under the zone of physical danger rule, he
would have had to amend his complaint to allege that he feared for his own safety as a
result of his location within the zone of physical danger. To do so would seem rather
contrived. It would be difficult to believe that Rickey feared that his clothing would like-
wise become entangled in the escalator or that he in any other way apprehended imme-
diate physcial harm. Given the tender ages of the two boys, and their close familial rela-
tionship, it is entirely conceivable that Rickey experienced genuine emotional distress as
a result of fear for his brother's safety. While Robert Rickey may go uncompensated for
his emotional injury under the zone of physical danger test, he would have had a better
opportunity to recover under the foreseeability standard. Rickey was closely related to the
primary victim, located at the scene as it occurred, and manifested physical symptoms of
his emotional distress. See also Liebson, supra note 11, at 174 (discussing the increased
potential of fraudulent pleading under the zone of danger test).
179. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
180. Ieibson, supra note 11, at 197-98.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 195-209, describing the grief reaction and its capability of being measured
in a court of law.
183. Id.
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loss or injury of a loved one due to a tortfeasor's negligence. 184 In
effect, it limits recovery to family members who witness the
tortious occurrence.
The foreseeability standard originated only sixteen years ago.185
The standard reflects the courts' increasing receptivity to twen-
tieth century advances in medicine, and also evidences an in-
creased respect for the interest in emotional well-being. Had Illi-
nois adopted the foreseeability standard,186 the benefits would
not only have accrued to Robert Rickey. An entire class of
plaintiffs would have benefitted, most of whom will now, under
the zone of physical danger test, bear the total burden of a negligent
tortfeasor's wrongdoing.
CONCLUSION
By adopting the zone of physical danger rule, the Illinois
Supreme Court has provided for predictable determinations of
liability in a field of tort law abounding with gray areas. However,
in its conservative expansion of the law governing the negligent
infliction of emotional distress cause of action, the Rickey decision
has placed bystanders in no better a position to recover than
under the impact rule. Rickey avoided coming to terms with the
practical effects of the imposition of the zone of physical danger
rule, as well as the substantive issues surrounding the problem
of bystander recovery. Perhaps if it had confronted these issues,
Illinois would have instead adopted the foreseeability standard,
under which Illinois courts would have had flexible, realistic
guidelines with which to make case-by-case determinations of
liability. More importantly, adoption of the foreseeability stand-
ard would have enabled the innocent bystander to more effec-
tively vindicate his right to be free from emotional distress.
HILDA C. CONTRERAS
184. See, e.g., Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978);
Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977).
185. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
186. Illinois could have abandoned the impact rule in favor of the foreseeability stand-
ard with the physical manifestations requirement, as did Massachusetts in Dziokonski
v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). Illinois could also have abandoned
the impact rule in favor of the foreseeability standard without the physical manifesta-
tions requirement, as did the court in Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433
(Me. 1982). See supra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
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